Politics and Government

Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius

A Timeless Guide to Leadership and StatecraftBy Niccolò Machiavelli

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In "Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius," Niccol√≤ Machiavelli offers a profound analysis of political systems through the lens of Roman history. Written in a logical and methodical style, this work contrasts the republics of ancient Rome with the political landscape of Renaissance Italy. Machiavelli meticulously dissects the dynamics of power, governance, and civil conflict, illustrating how his observations stem from a deep understanding of human nature and civic virtue. His use of historical examples serves not only to elucidate his arguments but also to provide a blueprint for contemporary political thought, marking this text as a cornerstone of political philosophy. Machiavelli, a diplomat and philosopher in the turbulent backdrop of 16th-century Florence, wrote the "Discourses" during his exile. His experiences witnessing the instability of Italian city-states, along with his admiration for the Roman republic, profoundly influenced his reflections on government and society. As an astute observer of human motivation, Machiavelli critiques the moral implications of political actions, seeking to understand the essence of effective leadership beyond mere power. This book is essential for scholars, political theorists, and anyone interested in the foundations of modern governance. Machiavelli's insights into the nature of power, liberty, and the role of civic responsibility resonate through the centuries, making the "Discourses" not only relevant but crucial for understanding the complexities of today'Äôs political arena.

Political Intrigue Royalty & Courts War & Battle Conspiracy Psychological Survival Hero Rebellion

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GenrePolitics and Government

Length15 hrs 3 mins

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FormateBook with Audio

Publish dateNov 19, 2019

LanguageEnglish

1Introduction

75CHAPTER X.—That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the Sinews of War.

2BOOK I.

76CHAPTER XI.—That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has Reputation rather than Strength.

3NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI

77CHAPTER XII.—Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it.

4BOOK I.

78CHAPTER XIII.—That Men rise from humble to high Fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force.

5CHAPTER I.—Of the Beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of Rome.

79CHAPTER XIV.—That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility.

Show all chapters

6CHAPTER II.—Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged.

80CHAPTER XV.—That weak States are always dubious in their Resolves; and that tardy Resolves are always hurtful.

7CHAPTER III.—Of the Accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People; whereby the Republic was made more perfect.

81CHAPTER XVI.—That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient Warfare.

8CHAPTER IV.—That the Dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome, made Rome free and powerful.

82CHAPTER XVII.—What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just.

9CHAPTER V.—Whether the Guardianship of public Freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire Power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater cause of Commotions.

83CHAPTER XVIII.—That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient Warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse.

10CHAPTER VI.—Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the Differences between the Commons and the Senate.

84CHAPTER XIX.—That Acquisitions made by ill-governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their Ruin than to their Aggrandizement.

11CHAPTER VII.—That to preserve Liberty in a State there must exist the Right to accuse.

85CHAPTER XX.—Of the Dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms.

12CHAPTER VIII.—That Calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful.

86CHAPTER XXI.—That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make War.

13CHAPTER IX.—That to give new Institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old Institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man.

87CHAPTER XXII.—That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss.

14CHAPTER X.—That in proportion as the Founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits Praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves Blame.

88CHAPTER XXIII.—That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances required it the Romans always avoided half-measures.

15CHAPTER XI.—Of the Religion of the Romans.

89CHAPTER XXIV.—That, commonly, Fortresses do much more Harm than Good

16CHAPTER XII.—That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined.

90CHAPTER XXV.—That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get possession of it through its Divisions.

17CHAPTER XIII.—Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving Institutions to their City, in carrying out their Enterprises, and in quelling Tumults.

91CHAPTER XXVI.—That Taunts and Abuse breed Hatred against him who uses them, without yielding him any Advantage.

18CHAPTER XIV.—That the Romans interpreted the Auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the Rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished.

92CHAPTER XXVII.—That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a Victory; for, commonly, when they are not, theft-Victory turns to Defeat.

19CHAPTER XV.—How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken Fortunes, had recourse to Religion.

93CHAPTER XXVIII.—That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth.

20CHAPTER XVI.—That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that Freedom.

94CHAPTER XXIX.—That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them hinder her Designs.

21CHAPTER XVII.—That a corrupt People obtaining Freedom can hardly preserve it.

95CHAPTER XXX.—That really powerful Princes and, Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with Money, but with their Valour and the Fame of their Prowess.

22CHAPTER XVIII.—How a Free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created.

96CHAPTER XXXI.—Of the Danger of trusting banished Men.

23CHAPTER XIX.—After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second.

97CHAPTER XXXII.—In how many Ways the Romans gained Possession of Towns.

24CHAPTER XX.—That the consecutive Reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a Succession of valiant Rulers by whom their Power and Growth are rapidly extended.

98CHAPTER XXXIII.—That the Romans intrusted the Captains of their Armies with the fullest Powers.

25CHAPTER XXI.—That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a national Army.

99BOOK III.

26CHAPTER XXII.—What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii.

100CHAPTER II.—That on occasion it is wise to feign Folly.

27CHAPTER XXIII.—That we should never hazard our whole Fortunes where we put not forth our entire Strength; for which reason to guard a Defile is often hurtful.

101CHAPTER III.—That to preserve a newly acquired Freedom we must slay the Sons of Brutus.

28CHAPTER XXIV.—That well-ordered States always provide Rewards and Punishments for their Citizens; and never set off Deserts against Misdeeds.

102CHAPTER IV.—That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it.

29CHAPTER XXV.—That he who would reform the Institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old Ways.

103CHAPTER V.—How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom.

30CHAPTER XXVI.—A new Prince in a City or Province of which he has taken Possession, ought to make Everything new.

104CHAPTER VI.—Of Conspiracies.

31CHAPTER XXVII.—That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad.

105CHAPTER VII.—Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without Bloodshed, but at other times reek with Blood.

32CHAPTER XXVIII.—Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their Citizens than were the Athenians.

106CHAPTER VIII.—That he who would effect Changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed to its Character and Condition

33CHAPTER XXIX.—Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful.

107CHAPTER IX.—That to enjoy constant good Fortune we must change with the Times.

34CHAPTER XXX.—How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of Ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it.

108CHAPTER X.—That a Captain cannot escape Battle when his Enemy forces it on him at all risks.

35CHAPTER XXXI.—That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for Misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their Ignorance or Want of Judgment, were not punished at all.

109CHAPTER XI.—That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset.

36CHAPTER XXXII.—That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay conferring Benefits until they are themselves in difficulties.

110CHAPTER XII.—A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity.

37CHAPTER XXXIII.—When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with Violence.

111CHAPTER XIII.—Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain.

38CHAPTER XXXIV.—That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic: and that it is not those Powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves, that are pernicious to a State.

112CHAPTER XIV.—Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights or Sounds.

39CHAPTER XXXV—Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the Liberties of that Republic

113CHAPTER XV.—That one and not many should head an Army: and why it is harmful to have more Leaders than one.

40CHAPTER XXXVI.—That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower.

114CHAPTER XVI.—That in Times of Difficulty true Worth is sought after; whereas in quiet Times it is not the most deserving, but those who are recommended by Wealth or Connection who are most in favour.

41CHAPTER XXXVII.—Of the Mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a Law opposed to ancient Usage and with stringent retrospective Effect.

115CHAPTER XVII.—That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an important Office or Command.

42CHAPTER XXXVIII.—That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice.

116CHAPTER XVIII.—That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be able to forestall the designs of his Adversary.

43CHAPTER XXXIX.—That often the same Accidents are seen to befall different Nations.

117CHAPTER XIX.—Whether Indulgence or Severity be more necessary for controlling a Multitude.

44CHAPTER XL.—Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other Matters is shown how the same Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth.

118CHAPTER XX.—How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii, than all the might of the Roman Arms.

45CHAPTER XLI.—That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble.

119CHAPTER XXI.—How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other achieved in Spain.

46CHAPTER XLII.—How easily Men become corrupted.

120Chapter XXII.—That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory.

47CHAPTER XLIII.—That Men fighting in their own Cause make good and resolute Soldiers.

121CHAPTER XXIII.—Why Camillus was banished from Rome.

48CHAPTER XLIV.—That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave.

122CHAPTER XXIV.—That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude.

49CHAPTER XLV.—That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker of a Law, not to observe the Law when made: and that daily to renew acts of injustice in a City is most hurtful to the Governor.

123CHAPTER XXV.—_Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens.

50CHAPTER XLVI.—That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another, seeking at first to escape Injury and then to injure others.

124CHAPTER XXVI.—How Women are a cause of the ruin of States.

51CHAPTER XLVII.—That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, in Particulars they judge truly.

125CHAPTER XXVII.

52CHAPTER XLVIII.—He who would not have an Office bestowed on some worthless or wicked Person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good.

126CHAPTER XXVIII.

53CHAPTER XLIX.—That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in Freedom, have had difficulty in framing such Laws as would preserve their Freedom, Cities which at the first have been in Subjection will find this almost impossible.

127CHAPTER XXIX.—That the Faults of a People are due to its Prince.

54CHAPTER L.—That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay.

128CHAPTER XXX.—That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy.

55CHAPTER LI.—What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should seem to be done by Choice.

129CHAPTER XXXI.—That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every change the same Spirit and Bearing.

56CHAPTER LII.—That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer Method, or less open to objection, than to forestall him in those Ways whereby he seeks to advance himself.

130CHAPTER XXXII.—Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible.

57CHAPTER LIII.—That the People, deceived by a false show of Advantage, often desire what would be their Ruin; and that large Hopes and brave Promises easily move them.

131CHAPTER XXXIII.—That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your Men with confidence in one another and in you.

58CHAPTER LIV.—Of the boundless Authority which a great Man may use to restrain an excited Multitude.

132CHAPTER XXXIV.—By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic are led to favour a Fellow-citizen: and-whether the Magistracies are bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a Prince.

59CHAPTER LV.—That Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where Equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not.

133CHAPTER XXXV.—Of the Danger incurred in being the first to recommend new Measures; and that the more unusual the Measures the greater the Danger.

60CHAPTER LVI.—That when great Calamities are about to befall a City or Country, Signs are seen to presage, and Seers arise who foretell them.

134CHAPTER XXXVI.—Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less than Women.

61CHAPTER LVII.—That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak.

135CHAPTER XXXVII.—Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy.

62CHAPTER LVIII.—That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince

136CHAPTER XXXVIII.—Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide.

63CHAPTER LIX.—To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes.

137CHAPTER XXXIX.—That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places.

64CHAPTER LX.—That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age.

138CHAPTER XL.—That Fraud is fair in War.

65BOOK II.

139CHAPTER XLI.—That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour; and in either way is well defended.

66CHAPTER I.—Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune.

140CHAPTER XLII.—That Promises made on Compulsion are not to be observed.

67CHAPTER II.—With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom.

141CHAPTER XLIII.—That Men born in the same Province retain through all Times nearly the same Character.

68CHAPTER III.—That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of Citizenship.

142CHAPTER XLIV.—That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring often succeed.

69CHAPTER IV.—That Commonwealths have followed three Methods for extending their Power.

143CHAPTER XLV.—Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the Enemy&#x27;s attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset.

70CHAPTER V.—That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the Memory of the Past.

144CHAPTER XLVI.—How the Characteristics of Families come to be perpetuated.

71CHAPTER VI.—Of the Methods followed by the Romans in making War.

145CHAPTER XLVII.—That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to forget private Wrongs.

72CHAPTER VII.—Of the Quantity of Land assigned by the Romans to each Colonist.

146CHAPTER XLVIII.—That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder, we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind.

73CHAPTER VIII.—Why certain Nations leave their ancestral Seats and overflow the Countries of others.

147CHAPTER XLIX.—That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant need of new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius received the surname of Maximus.

74CHAPTER IX.—Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between States.