
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius
A Timeless Guide to Leadership and StatecraftBy Niccolò MachiavelliLength15h 3m
About this audiobook
In "Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius," Niccol√≤ Machiavelli offers a profound analysis of political systems through the lens of Roman history. Written in a logical and methodical style, this work contrasts the republics of ancient Rome with the political landscape of Renaissance Italy. Machiavelli meticulously dissects the dynamics of power, governance, and civil conflict, illustrating how his observations stem from a deep understanding of human nature and civic virtue. His use of historical examples serves not only to elucidate his arguments but also to provide a blueprint for contemporary political thought, marking this text as a cornerstone of political philosophy. Machiavelli, a diplomat and philosopher in the turbulent backdrop of 16th-century Florence, wrote the "Discourses" during his exile. His experiences witnessing the instability of Italian city-states, along with his admiration for the Roman republic, profoundly influenced his reflections on government and society. As an astute observer of human motivation, Machiavelli critiques the moral implications of political actions, seeking to understand the essence of effective leadership beyond mere power. This book is essential for scholars, political theorists, and anyone interested in the foundations of modern governance. Machiavelli's insights into the nature of power, liberty, and the role of civic responsibility resonate through the centuries, making the "Discourses" not only relevant but crucial for understanding the complexities of today'Äôs political arena.
Audiobook details
GenrePolitics and Government
Length15 hrs 3 mins
Narrated byListen with 1,000+ voices
FormateBook with Audio
Publish dateNov 19, 2019
LanguageEnglish
Table of contents
1Introduction
2BOOK I.
3NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI
4BOOK I.
5CHAPTER I.—Of the Beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of Rome.
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6CHAPTER II.—Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged.
7CHAPTER III.—Of the Accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People; whereby the Republic was made more perfect.
8CHAPTER IV.—That the Dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome, made Rome free and powerful.
9CHAPTER V.—Whether the Guardianship of public Freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire Power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater cause of Commotions.
10CHAPTER VI.—Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the Differences between the Commons and the Senate.
11CHAPTER VII.—That to preserve Liberty in a State there must exist the Right to accuse.
12CHAPTER VIII.—That Calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful.
13CHAPTER IX.—That to give new Institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old Institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man.
14CHAPTER X.—That in proportion as the Founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits Praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves Blame.
15CHAPTER XI.—Of the Religion of the Romans.
16CHAPTER XII.—That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined.
17CHAPTER XIII.—Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving Institutions to their City, in carrying out their Enterprises, and in quelling Tumults.
18CHAPTER XIV.—That the Romans interpreted the Auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the Rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished.
19CHAPTER XV.—How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken Fortunes, had recourse to Religion.
20CHAPTER XVI.—That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that Freedom.
21CHAPTER XVII.—That a corrupt People obtaining Freedom can hardly preserve it.
22CHAPTER XVIII.—How a Free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created.
23CHAPTER XIX.—After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second.
24CHAPTER XX.—That the consecutive Reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a Succession of valiant Rulers by whom their Power and Growth are rapidly extended.
25CHAPTER XXI.—That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a national Army.
26CHAPTER XXII.—What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii.
27CHAPTER XXIII.—That we should never hazard our whole Fortunes where we put not forth our entire Strength; for which reason to guard a Defile is often hurtful.
28CHAPTER XXIV.—That well-ordered States always provide Rewards and Punishments for their Citizens; and never set off Deserts against Misdeeds.
29CHAPTER XXV.—That he who would reform the Institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old Ways.
30CHAPTER XXVI.—A new Prince in a City or Province of which he has taken Possession, ought to make Everything new.
31CHAPTER XXVII.—That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad.
32CHAPTER XXVIII.—Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their Citizens than were the Athenians.
33CHAPTER XXIX.—Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful.
34CHAPTER XXX.—How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of Ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it.
35CHAPTER XXXI.—That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for Misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their Ignorance or Want of Judgment, were not punished at all.
36CHAPTER XXXII.—That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay conferring Benefits until they are themselves in difficulties.
37CHAPTER XXXIII.—When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with Violence.
38CHAPTER XXXIV.—That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic: and that it is not those Powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves, that are pernicious to a State.
39CHAPTER XXXV—Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the Liberties of that Republic
40CHAPTER XXXVI.—That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower.
41CHAPTER XXXVII.—Of the Mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a Law opposed to ancient Usage and with stringent retrospective Effect.
42CHAPTER XXXVIII.—That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice.
43CHAPTER XXXIX.—That often the same Accidents are seen to befall different Nations.
44CHAPTER XL.—Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other Matters is shown how the same Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth.
45CHAPTER XLI.—That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble.
46CHAPTER XLII.—How easily Men become corrupted.
47CHAPTER XLIII.—That Men fighting in their own Cause make good and resolute Soldiers.
48CHAPTER XLIV.—That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave.
49CHAPTER XLV.—That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker of a Law, not to observe the Law when made: and that daily to renew acts of injustice in a City is most hurtful to the Governor.
50CHAPTER XLVI.—That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another, seeking at first to escape Injury and then to injure others.