6III SHALL WE RENOUNCE THE USE OF THE H-BOMB?
254. Is control over fissionable materials sufficient to prevent the production of hydrogen bombs? If so, is the existing UN plan adequate to this task?
7IV KOREA CLEARED THE AIR
265. Must H-bomb controls relate to deuterium and tritium as well as to fissionable material? If they must, can the present UN plan fully provide for these controls or does it require revision or changes in emphasis?
8V A PRIMER OF ATOMIC ENERGY
276. Is it technically possible to detect the manufacture of heavy water and deuterium through international inspection? Would an international agreement flatly prohibiting production in quantity be desirable?
9THE HYDROGEN BOMB AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
287. Should the provisions of the present un plan relating to inspection, surveys, and explorations be modified to control heavy water and deuterium production?
10A SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
298. What safeguards are necessary to prevent clandestine production of tritium? Would an international agreement flatly prohibiting production in quantity be desirable?
11The Truman-Attlee-King declaration
309. Should a world-wide geological survey cover concentrated lithium deposits?
12The Acheson-Lilienthal report
3110. Do the technical facts of the H-bomb mean that now, more than ever, the United Nations plan is the correct approach to international control?
13The Baruch proposals to the United Nations
3211. How does the H-bomb affect the problem of “stages”?
14The first Soviet proposals—Gromyko’s statement of June 19, 1946
3312. How does the H-bomb bear upon the problem of disposition of existing stocks of fissionable material?
15The Soviet Proposals of June 11, 1947
3413. How does the H-bomb bear upon “quotas”?
16The Second and Third Reports of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission—September 11, 1947, and May 17, 1948
3514. How does the H-bomb bear upon research to be performed by the United Nations control agency?
17Atomic energy negotiations since 1948
3615. Should technical information regarding the H-bomb be transmitted to the United Nations as a basis for a discussion of hydrogen control?
18International Inspection
3716. Should a new panel of experts analogous to the Acheson-Lilienthal Board be appointed to study the H-bomb in relation to international control?
19International ownership and management
