
Length5h 15m
About this audiobook
"The hell bomb" by William L. Laurence. Published by Good Press. Good Press publishes a wide range of titles that encompasses every genre. From well-known classics & literary fiction and non-fiction to forgotten−or yet undiscovered gems−of world literature, we issue the books that need to be read. Each Good Press edition has been meticulously edited and formatted to boost readability for all e-readers and devices. Our goal is to produce eBooks that are user-friendly and accessible to everyone in a high-quality digital format.
Audiobook details
Rating★★★★ 3.8 (19)
Includes Goodreads, LibraryThing
GenreLiterary Classics, Other
Length5 hrs 15 mins
Narrated byListen with 1,000+ voices
FormateBook with Audio
Publish dateMay 3, 2025
LanguageEnglish
Table of contents
1Introduction
2FOREWORD
3INTRODUCTION
4I THE TRUTH ABOUT THE HYDROGEN BOMB
5II THE REAL SECRET OF THE HYDROGEN BOMB
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6III SHALL WE RENOUNCE THE USE OF THE H-BOMB?
7IV KOREA CLEARED THE AIR
8V A PRIMER OF ATOMIC ENERGY
9THE HYDROGEN BOMB AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
10A SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
11The Truman-Attlee-King declaration
12The Acheson-Lilienthal report
13The Baruch proposals to the United Nations
14The first Soviet proposals—Gromyko’s statement of June 19, 1946
15The Soviet Proposals of June 11, 1947
16The Second and Third Reports of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission—September 11, 1947, and May 17, 1948
17Atomic energy negotiations since 1948
18International Inspection
19International ownership and management
20Strategic balance (quotas)
21Sanctions
221. Is the hydrogen bomb a more or less important weapon than the atomic bomb? Might hydrogen bombs prove to be decisive in war, or has their significance been exaggerated?
232. If the H-bomb is deemed to be decisive or far more dangerous than the A-bomb, should international control of hydrogen weapons take priority over control of ordinary atomic weapons? Should the United States propose a separate plan exclusively designed to regulate H-bombs?
243. Is the existing United Nations plan technically adequate to control H-bombs?
254. Is control over fissionable materials sufficient to prevent the production of hydrogen bombs? If so, is the existing UN plan adequate to this task?
265. Must H-bomb controls relate to deuterium and tritium as well as to fissionable material? If they must, can the present UN plan fully provide for these controls or does it require revision or changes in emphasis?
276. Is it technically possible to detect the manufacture of heavy water and deuterium through international inspection? Would an international agreement flatly prohibiting production in quantity be desirable?
287. Should the provisions of the present un plan relating to inspection, surveys, and explorations be modified to control heavy water and deuterium production?
298. What safeguards are necessary to prevent clandestine production of tritium? Would an international agreement flatly prohibiting production in quantity be desirable?
309. Should a world-wide geological survey cover concentrated lithium deposits?
3110. Do the technical facts of the H-bomb mean that now, more than ever, the United Nations plan is the correct approach to international control?
3211. How does the H-bomb affect the problem of “stages”?
3312. How does the H-bomb bear upon the problem of disposition of existing stocks of fissionable material?
3413. How does the H-bomb bear upon “quotas”?
3514. How does the H-bomb bear upon research to be performed by the United Nations control agency?
3615. Should technical information regarding the H-bomb be transmitted to the United Nations as a basis for a discussion of hydrogen control?
3716. Should a new panel of experts analogous to the Acheson-Lilienthal Board be appointed to study the H-bomb in relation to international control?