6Section 3. Concerning The Meaning Of The Terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &C; And Of Contingence.
29Section 6. Liberty Of Indifference, Not Only Not Necessary To Virtue, But Utterly Inconsistent With It; And All, Either Virtuous Or Vicious Habits Or Inclinations.
7Section 4. Of The Distinction Of Natural And Moral Necessity, And Inability.
30Section 7. Arminian Notions Of Moral Agency Inconsistent With All Influence Of Motive And Inducement, In Either Virtuous Or Vicious Actions.
8Section 5. Concerning The Notion Of Liberty, And Of Moral Agency.
31Part IV.
9Part II.
32Section 1. The Essence Of The Virtue And Vice Of Dispositions Of The Heart, And Acts Of The Will, Lies Not In Their Cause, But Their Nature.
10Section I. Showing The Manifest Inconsistence Of The Arminian Notion Of Liberty Of Will, Consisting In The Will's Self-Determining Power.
33Section 2. The Falseness And Inconsistence Of That Metaphysical Notion Of Action, And Agency, Which Seems To Be Generally Entertained By The Defenders Of The Arminian Doctrine Concerning Liberty, Moral Agency, &C.
11Section 2. Several Supposed Ways Of Evading The Forgoing Reasoning, Considered.
34Section 3. The Reasons Why Some Think It Contrary To Common Sense, To Suppose Those Things Which Are Necessary, To Be Worthy Of Either Praise Or Blame.
12Section 3. Whether Any Event Whatsoever, And Volition In Particular, Can Come To Pass Without A Cause Of Its Existence.
35Section 4. It Is Agreeable To Common Sense, And The Natural Notions Of Mankind, To Suppose Moral Necessity To Be Consistent With Praise And Blame, Reward And Punishment.
13Section 4. Whether Volition Can Arise Without A Cause, Through The Activity Of The Nature Of The Soul.
36Section 5. Concerning Those Objections, That This Scheme Of Necessity Renders All Means And Endeavours For The Avoiding Of Sin, Or The Obtaining Virtue And Holiness.
14Section 5. Showing, That If The Things Asserted In These Evasions Should Be Supposed To Be True, They Are Altogether Impertinent, And Can't Help The Cause Of Arminian Liberty.
37Section 6. Concerning That Objection Against The Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, That It Agrees With The Stoical Doctrine Of Fate, And The Opinions Of Mr. Hobbes.
15Section 6. Concerning The Will's Determining In Things Which Are Perfectly Indifferent, In The View Of The Mind.
38Section 7. Concerning The Necessity Of The Divine Will.
16Section 7. Concerning The Notion Of Liberty Of Will Consisting In Indifference.
39Section 8. Some Further Objections Against The Moral Necessity Of God's Volitions Considered.
17Section 8. Concerning The Supposed Liberty Of The Will, As Opposite To All Necessity.
40Section 9. Concerning That Objection Against The Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, That It Makes God The Author Of Sin.
18Section 9. Of The Connection Of The Acts Of The Will With The Dictates Of The Understanding.
41Section 10. Concerning Sin's First Entrance Into The World.
19Section 10. Volition Necessarily Connected With The Influence Of Motives.
42Section 11. Of A Supposed Inconsistence Of These Principles, With God's Moral Character.
20Section 11. The Evidence Of God's Certain Foreknowledge Of The Volitions Of Moral Agents.
43Section 12. Of A Supposed Tendency Of These Principles To Atheism And Licentiousness.
21Section 12. God's Certain Foreknowledge Of The Future Volitions Of Moral Agents, Inconsistent With Such A Contingence Of Those Volitions, As Is Without All Necessity.
44Section 13. Concerning That Objection Against The Reasoning, By Which The Calvinistic Doctrine Is Supported, That It Is Metaphysical And Abstruse.
22Section 13. Whether We Suppose The Volitions Of Moral Agents To Be Connected With Any Thing Antecedent, Or Not, Yet They Must Be Necessary In Such A Sense As To Overthrow Arminian Liberty.
45Conclusion
23Part III.
