Spirituality and Religion

The Freedom of the Will

By Jonathan Edwards

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Length13h 53m

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In Jonathan Edwards' 'The Freedom of the Will,' the author tackles the heavy theological concept of free will versus determinism, presenting his arguments with a profound and analytical approach. Edwards delves into the nature of the human will and its relationship to moral responsibility, exploring the complexities of divine sovereignty and human choice in a compelling manner. Written in a persuasive and academic style, this book is a significant contribution to the field of philosophy and theology, reflecting Edwards' deep understanding of the subject matter. The book is a must-read for those interested in exploring the intersection of faith, reason, and ethics in a thought-provoking manner. Jonathan Edwards, a renowned American theologian and philosopher, was known for his intellectual prowess and influential sermons. His profound insights into the human condition and his profound grasp of religious doctrine are evident in 'The Freedom of the Will,' making it a seminal work in the realm of theological discourse. I highly recommend this book to readers seeking a profound and stimulating exploration of the philosophical and theological implications of free will.

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Audiobook details

GenreSpirituality and Religion

Length13 hrs 53 mins

Narrated byListen with 1,000+ voices

FormateBook with Audio

Publish dateDec 21, 2018

LanguageEnglish

1The Freedom of the Will

24Section 1. God&#x27;s Moral Excellency Necessary, Yet Virtuous And Praise-Worthy.

2Preface

25Section 2. The Acts Of The Will Of The Human Soul Of Jesus Christ Necessarily Holy, Yet Truly Virtuous, Praise-Worthy, Rewardable, &amp;C.

3Part I.

26Section 3. The Case Of Such As Are Given Up Of God To Sin, And Of Fallen Man In General, Proves Moral Necessity And Inability To Be Consistent With Blame-Worthiness.

4Section 1. Concerning The Nature Of The Will.

27Section 4. Command, And Obligation To Obedience, Consistent With Moral Inability To Obey.

5Section 2. Concerning The Determination Of The Will.

28Section 5. That Sincerity Of Desires And Endeavours, Which Is Supposed To Excuse In The Non-Performance Of Things In Themselves Good, Particularly Considered.

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6Section 3. Concerning The Meaning Of The Terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &amp;C; And Of Contingence.

29Section 6. Liberty Of Indifference, Not Only Not Necessary To Virtue, But Utterly Inconsistent With It; And All, Either Virtuous Or Vicious Habits Or Inclinations.

7Section 4. Of The Distinction Of Natural And Moral Necessity, And Inability.

30Section 7. Arminian Notions Of Moral Agency Inconsistent With All Influence Of Motive And Inducement, In Either Virtuous Or Vicious Actions.

8Section 5. Concerning The Notion Of Liberty, And Of Moral Agency.

31Part IV.

9Part II.

32Section 1. The Essence Of The Virtue And Vice Of Dispositions Of The Heart, And Acts Of The Will, Lies Not In Their Cause, But Their Nature.

10Section I. Showing The Manifest Inconsistence Of The Arminian Notion Of Liberty Of Will, Consisting In The Will&#x27;s Self-Determining Power.

33Section 2. The Falseness And Inconsistence Of That Metaphysical Notion Of Action, And Agency, Which Seems To Be Generally Entertained By The Defenders Of The Arminian Doctrine Concerning Liberty, Moral Agency, &amp;C.

11Section 2. Several Supposed Ways Of Evading The Forgoing Reasoning, Considered.

34Section 3. The Reasons Why Some Think It Contrary To Common Sense, To Suppose Those Things Which Are Necessary, To Be Worthy Of Either Praise Or Blame.

12Section 3. Whether Any Event Whatsoever, And Volition In Particular, Can Come To Pass Without A Cause Of Its Existence.

35Section 4. It Is Agreeable To Common Sense, And The Natural Notions Of Mankind, To Suppose Moral Necessity To Be Consistent With Praise And Blame, Reward And Punishment.

13Section 4. Whether Volition Can Arise Without A Cause, Through The Activity Of The Nature Of The Soul.

36Section 5. Concerning Those Objections, That This Scheme Of Necessity Renders All Means And Endeavours For The Avoiding Of Sin, Or The Obtaining Virtue And Holiness.

14Section 5. Showing, That If The Things Asserted In These Evasions Should Be Supposed To Be True, They Are Altogether Impertinent, And Can&#x27;t Help The Cause Of Arminian Liberty.

37Section 6. Concerning That Objection Against The Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, That It Agrees With The Stoical Doctrine Of Fate, And The Opinions Of Mr. Hobbes.

15Section 6. Concerning The Will&#x27;s Determining In Things Which Are Perfectly Indifferent, In The View Of The Mind.

38Section 7. Concerning The Necessity Of The Divine Will.

16Section 7. Concerning The Notion Of Liberty Of Will Consisting In Indifference.

39Section 8. Some Further Objections Against The Moral Necessity Of God&#x27;s Volitions Considered.

17Section 8. Concerning The Supposed Liberty Of The Will, As Opposite To All Necessity.

40Section 9. Concerning That Objection Against The Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, That It Makes God The Author Of Sin.

18Section 9. Of The Connection Of The Acts Of The Will With The Dictates Of The Understanding.

41Section 10. Concerning Sin&#x27;s First Entrance Into The World.

19Section 10. Volition Necessarily Connected With The Influence Of Motives.

42Section 11. Of A Supposed Inconsistence Of These Principles, With God&#x27;s Moral Character.

20Section 11. The Evidence Of God&#x27;s Certain Foreknowledge Of The Volitions Of Moral Agents.

43Section 12. Of A Supposed Tendency Of These Principles To Atheism And Licentiousness.

21Section 12. God&#x27;s Certain Foreknowledge Of The Future Volitions Of Moral Agents, Inconsistent With Such A Contingence Of Those Volitions, As Is Without All Necessity.

44Section 13. Concerning That Objection Against The Reasoning, By Which The Calvinistic Doctrine Is Supported, That It Is Metaphysical And Abstruse.

22Section 13. Whether We Suppose The Volitions Of Moral Agents To Be Connected With Any Thing Antecedent, Or Not, Yet They Must Be Necessary In Such A Sense As To Overthrow Arminian Liberty.

45Conclusion

23Part III.