61. Belief-System, Creed, Worldview, Doctrine
33The Imminence of the End Times (Apocalypticism and Eschatology)
7I. Introduction
34The Caliphate Now!
8II. The Al-Qaeda Organization (Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad)
35The “Final Solution” to the “Shia Problem”
9Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy
36The Nearest Enemy is the Ummah’s Truest Enemy!
10SunniSalafism/“Fundamentalism”
37ISO Relative Divergences from AQO
11The Muwahhidun/Wahhabism/Salafi-Wahhabism
382. Terrorist Modus Operandi
12Shaykh Scholar-Mujahid, Dr. Abdallah Azzam: The Individual Obligation to Join the Caravan in Defense of Muslim Lands: An Armed Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi Synthesis
39I. Introduction.: Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis(TQA)
13The “Base of the Jihad”; Al-Qaeda (Qa‘idat Al-Jihad)
40II. The Al-Qaeda Organization (Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad)
14From Qa'idat Al-Jihadto Bin Ladenism
41TQA, I: The “Classical” Base First Bin Ladenist “Far Enemy“ Strategy
15From Bin Ladenism Back to Qa‘idat Al-Jihad? Back to the Future? Hubris, Delusion, Disaster, and the Remaking/Rebirth of a Post-Bin Laden, Post-Arab Spring Qa'idat Al-Jihad
42TQA, II: The AQAP “Lone Mujahid” “Far Enemy” Strategy
16What is Qa'idat Al-Jihad?” In a Nutshell: Fazul Abdullah and Adam Gadahn
43III. Islamic State Organization (Tanzim Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyya): TQA: The ISO “State/Caliphate-First” Strategy
17III. Islamic State Organization (Tanzim Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyya)
443. Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for U.S. Government Policy and Strategy
18“Zarqawism” vs. AQO: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi’s Worldview and Doctrine: 1989-June 7, 2006
45I. Key Findings
19From Non-Religious Violent Street Tough to Ultra-Sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Prison Tough: 1980-1999
46Macro-Level Conclusion
20Al-Zarqawi’s Private Jihasist Armies of the Levant: 1999-2004
47Belief-Systems, Worldviews, Doctrines, Creeds
21Abdallah Al-Muhajir’s Ultra-Extremism in Takfir, and Takfir of the Shia
48Strategies and Terrorist Modus Operandi
22Abu Musa’b Al-Zarqawi's Embrace of Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir's Extremism in Takfir
49II. Implications for U.S. Government Policy and Strategies
23Zarqawism Unveiled as Doctrine and Strategy: Al-Zarqawi’s Negotiation and Bay’ah to Osama Bin Laden
50Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat AQO and its Affiliates
24Zarqawism: Its Three Essential Elements
51Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat the ISO
25“Neo-Zarqawism”: The Birth and Declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat Al’Iraq Al-Islamiyyah), and Rise of the New Emirs
52III. Recommendations
26Creedal/Doctrinal/Policy Comparision of ISO and AQO
53Recommendations for Senior Military Leaders, Planners, and Strategists
27Apocalypticism and Mahdism in Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir and Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi
54Recommendations for Leader Development and Education
